Make a copy of the IDT (as seen via the "sidt" instruction) read-only.
This primarily removes the IDT from being a target for arbitrary memory
write attacks, and has the added benefit of also not leaking the kernel
base offset, if it has been relocated.

We already did this on vendor == Intel and family == 5 because of the
F0 0F bug -- regardless of if a particular CPU had the F0 0F bug or
not.  Since the workaround was so cheap, there simply was no reason to
be very specific.  This patch extends the readonly alias to all CPUs,
but does not activate the #PF to #UD conversion code needed to deliver
the proper exception in the F0 0F case except on Intel family 5
processors.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20130410192422.GA17344@www.outflux.net


Cc: Eric Northup <digitaleric@google.com>
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>