Commit 31668511 authored by David Vrabel's avatar David Vrabel Committed by Stefano Stabellini

x86: skip check for spurious faults for non-present faults

If a fault on a kernel address is due to a non-present page, then it
cannot be the result of stale TLB entry from a protection change (RO
to RW or NX to X).  Thus the pagetable walk in spurious_fault() can be

See the initial if in spurious_fault() and the tests in
spurious_fault_check()) for the set of possible error codes checked
for spurious faults.  These are:

Before   x00xx && ( 1xxxx || xxx1x )
After  ( 10001 || 00011 ) && ( 1xxxx || xxx1x )

Thus the new condition is a subset of the previous one, excluding only
non-present faults (I == 1 and W == 1 are mutually exclusive).

This avoids spurious_fault() oopsing in some cases if the pagetables
it attempts to walk are not accessible.  This obscures the location of
the original fault.

This also fixes a crash with Xen PV guests when they access entries in
the M2P corresponding to device MMIO regions.  The M2P is mapped
(read-only) by Xen into the kernel address space of the guest and this
mapping may contains holes for non-RAM regions.  Read faults will
result in calls to spurious_fault(), but because the page tables for
the M2P mappings are not accessible by the guest the pagetable walk
would fault.

This was not normally a problem as MMIO mappings would not normally
result in a M2P lookup because of the use of the _PAGE_IOMAP bit the
PTE.  However, removing the _PAGE_IOMAP bit requires M2P lookups for
MMIO mappings as well.
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid Vrabel <>
Reported-by: default avatarKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk <>
Tested-by: default avatarKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk <>
Acked-by: default avatarDave Hansen <>
parent 342cd340
......@@ -933,8 +933,17 @@ static int spurious_fault_check(unsigned long error_code, pte_t *pte)
* cross-processor TLB flush, even if no stale TLB entries exist
* on other processors.
* Spurious faults may only occur if the TLB contains an entry with
* fewer permission than the page table entry. Non-present (P = 0)
* and reserved bit (R = 1) faults are never spurious.
* There are no security implications to leaving a stale TLB when
* increasing the permissions on a page.
* Returns non-zero if a spurious fault was handled, zero otherwise.
* See Intel Developer's Manual Vol 3 Section, bullet 3
* (Optional Invalidation).
static noinline int
spurious_fault(unsigned long error_code, unsigned long address)
......@@ -945,8 +954,17 @@ spurious_fault(unsigned long error_code, unsigned long address)
pte_t *pte;
int ret;
/* Reserved-bit violation or user access to kernel space? */
if (error_code & (PF_USER | PF_RSVD))
* Only writes to RO or instruction fetches from NX may cause
* spurious faults.
* These could be from user or supervisor accesses but the TLB
* is only lazily flushed after a kernel mapping protection
* change, so user accesses are not expected to cause spurious
* faults.
if (error_code != (PF_WRITE | PF_PROT)
&& error_code != (PF_INSTR | PF_PROT))
return 0;
pgd = init_mm.pgd + pgd_index(address);
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