1. 23 Sep, 2017 1 commit
    • Josh Poimboeuf's avatar
      x86/asm: Fix inline asm call constraints for Clang · f5caf621
      Josh Poimboeuf authored
      For inline asm statements which have a CALL instruction, we list the
      stack pointer as a constraint to convince GCC to ensure the frame
      pointer is set up first:
        static inline void foo()
      	register void *__sp asm(_ASM_SP);
      	asm("call bar" : "+r" (__sp))
      Unfortunately, that pattern causes Clang to corrupt the stack pointer.
      The fix is easy: convert the stack pointer register variable to a global
      It should be noted that the end result is different based on the GCC
      version.  With GCC 6.4, this patch has exactly the same result as
      	defconfig	defconfig-nofp	distro		distro-nofp
       before	9820389		9491555		8816046		8516940
       after	9820389		9491555		8816046		8516940
      With GCC 7.2, however, GCC's behavior has changed.  It now changes its
      behavior based on the conversion of the register variable to a global.
      That somehow convinces it to *always* set up the frame pointer before
      inserting *any* inline asm.  (Therefore, listing the variable as an
      output constraint is a no-op and is no longer necessary.)  It's a bit
      overkill, but the performance impact should be negligible.  And in fact,
      there's a nice improvement with frame pointers disabled:
      	defconfig	defconfig-nofp	distro		distro-nofp
       before	9796316		9468236		9076191		8790305
       after	9796957		9464267		9076381		8785949
      So in summary, while listing the stack pointer as an output constraint
      is no longer necessary for newer versions of GCC, it's still needed for
      older versions.
      Suggested-by: default avatarAndrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
      Reported-by: default avatarMatthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
      Cc: Dmitriy Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Miguel Bernal Marin <miguel.bernal.marin@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/3db862e970c432ae823cf515c52b54fec8270e0e.1505942196.git.jpoimboe@redhat.comSigned-off-by: default avatarIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
  2. 29 Aug, 2017 1 commit
  3. 03 Jul, 2017 1 commit
  4. 08 Jun, 2017 1 commit
  5. 14 Feb, 2017 1 commit
  6. 24 Feb, 2016 1 commit
    • Josh Poimboeuf's avatar
      x86/xen: Add stack frame dependency to hypercall inline asm calls · 0e8e2238
      Josh Poimboeuf authored
      If a hypercall is inlined at the beginning of a function, gcc can insert
      the call instruction before setting up a stack frame, which breaks frame
      pointer convention if CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER is enabled and can result in
      a bad stack trace.
      Force a stack frame to be created if CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER is enabled by
      listing the stack pointer as an output operand for the hypercall inline
      asm statements.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarDavid Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
      Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
      Cc: Bernd Petrovitsch <bernd@petrovitsch.priv.at>
      Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
      Cc: Chris J Arges <chris.j.arges@canonical.com>
      Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
      Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
      Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
      Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@gmail.com>
      Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: live-patching@vger.kernel.org
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/c6face5a46713108bded9c4c103637222abc4528.1453405861.git.jpoimboe@redhat.comSigned-off-by: default avatarIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
  7. 21 Dec, 2015 1 commit
  8. 28 Sep, 2015 1 commit
  9. 20 Aug, 2015 1 commit
  10. 24 Apr, 2014 1 commit
    • Ian Campbell's avatar
      arm: xen: implement multicall hypercall support. · 5e40704e
      Ian Campbell authored
      As part of this make the usual change to xen_ulong_t in place of unsigned long.
      This change has no impact on x86.
      The Linux definition of struct multicall_entry.result differs from the Xen
      definition, I think for good reasons, and used a long rather than an unsigned
      long. Therefore introduce a xen_long_t, which is a long on x86 architectures
      and a signed 64-bit integer on ARM.
      Use uint32_t nr_calls on x86 for consistency with the ARM definition.
      Build tested on amd64 and i386 builds. Runtime tested on ARM.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarIan Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
      Cc: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
      Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
      Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
  11. 22 Mar, 2013 1 commit
  12. 04 Nov, 2012 1 commit
    • Jan Beulich's avatar
      xen/hypercall: fix hypercall fallback code for very old hypervisors · cf47a83f
      Jan Beulich authored
      While copying the argument structures in HYPERVISOR_event_channel_op()
      and HYPERVISOR_physdev_op() into the local variable is sufficiently
      safe even if the actual structure is smaller than the container one,
      copying back eventual output values the same way isn't: This may
      collide with on-stack variables (particularly "rc") which may change
      between the first and second memcpy() (i.e. the second memcpy() could
      discard that change).
      Move the fallback code into out-of-line functions, and handle all of
      the operations known by this old a hypervisor individually: Some don't
      require copying back anything at all, and for the rest use the
      individual argument structures' sizes rather than the container's.
      Reported-by: default avatarDan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarJan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
      [v2: Reduce #define/#undef usage in HYPERVISOR_physdev_op_compat().]
      [v3: Fix compile errors when modules use said hypercalls]
      [v4: Add xen_ prefix to the HYPERCALL_..]
      [v5: Alter the name and only EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL one of them]
      Signed-off-by: default avatarKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
  13. 19 Jul, 2012 1 commit
  14. 26 Sep, 2011 1 commit
  15. 18 Jul, 2011 1 commit
  16. 26 May, 2011 1 commit
    • Dan Magenheimer's avatar
      xen: cleancache shim to Xen Transcendent Memory · 5bc20fc5
      Dan Magenheimer authored
      This patch provides a shim between the kernel-internal cleancache
      API (see Documentation/mm/cleancache.txt) and the Xen Transcendent
      Memory ABI (see http://oss.oracle.com/projects/tmem).
      Xen tmem provides "hypervisor RAM" as an ephemeral page-oriented
      pseudo-RAM store for cleancache pages, shared cleancache pages,
      and frontswap pages.  Tmem provides enterprise-quality concurrency,
      full save/restore and live migration support, compression
      and deduplication.
      A presentation showing up to 8% faster performance and up to 52%
      reduction in sectors read on a kernel compile workload, despite
      aggressive in-kernel page reclamation ("self-ballooning") can be
      found at:
      http://oss.oracle.com/projects/tmem/dist/documentation/presentations/TranscendentMemoryXenSummit2010.pdfSigned-off-by: default avatarDan Magenheimer <dan.magenheimer@oracle.com>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarJeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@goop.org>
      Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
      Cc: Matthew Wilcox <matthew@wil.cx>
      Cc: Nick Piggin <npiggin@kernel.dk>
      Cc: Mel Gorman <mel@csn.ul.ie>
      Cc: Rik Van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
      Cc: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@novell.com>
      Cc: Chris Mason <chris.mason@oracle.com>
      Cc: Andreas Dilger <adilger@sun.com>
      Cc: Ted Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
      Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.com>
      Cc: Joel Becker <joel.becker@oracle.com>
      Cc: Nitin Gupta <ngupta@vflare.org>
  17. 25 Feb, 2011 2 commits
  18. 20 Oct, 2010 1 commit
  19. 22 Jul, 2010 1 commit
  20. 12 Mar, 2009 1 commit
  21. 16 Dec, 2008 1 commit
  22. 23 Oct, 2008 3 commits
  23. 22 Jul, 2008 1 commit
    • Vegard Nossum's avatar
      x86: consolidate header guards · 77ef50a5
      Vegard Nossum authored
      This patch is the result of an automatic script that consolidates the
      format of all the headers in include/asm-x86/.
      The format:
      1. No leading underscore. Names with leading underscores are reserved.
      2. Pathname components are separated by two underscores. So we can
         distinguish between mm_types.h and mm/types.h.
      3. Everything except letters and numbers are turned into single
      Signed-off-by: default avatarVegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@gmail.com>
  24. 16 Jul, 2008 5 commits
  25. 27 May, 2008 2 commits
  26. 24 Apr, 2008 1 commit
  27. 11 Oct, 2007 1 commit
  28. 18 Jul, 2007 2 commits
    • Jeremy Fitzhardinge's avatar
      xen: Core Xen implementation · 5ead97c8
      Jeremy Fitzhardinge authored
      This patch is a rollup of all the core pieces of the Xen
      implementation, including:
       - booting and setup
       - pagetable setup
       - privileged instructions
       - segmentation
       - interrupt flags
       - upcalls
       - multicall batching
      The vmlinux image is decorated with ELF notes which tell the Xen
      domain builder what the kernel's requirements are; the domain builder
      then constructs the address space accordingly and starts the kernel.
      Xen has its own entrypoint for the kernel (contained in an ELF note).
      The ELF notes are set up by xen-head.S, which is included into head.S.
      In principle it could be linked separately, but it seems to provoke
      lots of binutils bugs.
      Because the domain builder starts the kernel in a fairly sane state
      (32-bit protected mode, paging enabled, flat segments set up), there's
      not a lot of setup needed before starting the kernel proper.  The main
      steps are:
        1. Install the Xen paravirt_ops, which is simply a matter of a
           structure assignment.
        2. Set init_mm to use the Xen-supplied pagetables (analogous to the
           head.S generated pagetables in a native boot).
        3. Reserve address space for Xen, since it takes a chunk at the top
           of the address space for its own use.
        4. Call start_kernel()
      Once we hit the main kernel boot sequence, it will end up calling back
      via paravirt_ops to set up various pieces of Xen specific state.  One
      of the critical things which requires a bit of extra care is the
      construction of the initial init_mm pagetable.  Because Xen places
      tight constraints on pagetables (an active pagetable must always be
      valid, and must always be mapped read-only to the guest domain), we
      need to be careful when constructing the new pagetable to keep these
      constraints in mind.  It turns out that the easiest way to do this is
      use the initial Xen-provided pagetable as a template, and then just
      insert new mappings for memory where a mapping doesn't already exist.
      This means that during pagetable setup, it uses a special version of
      xen_set_pte which ignores any attempt to remap a read-only page as
      read-write (since Xen will map its own initial pagetable as RO), but
      lets other changes to the ptes happen, so that things like NX are set
      When the kernel runs under Xen, it runs in ring 1 rather than ring 0.
      This means that it is more privileged than user-mode in ring 3, but it
      still can't run privileged instructions directly.  Non-performance
      critical instructions are dealt with by taking a privilege exception
      and trapping into the hypervisor and emulating the instruction, but
      more performance-critical instructions have their own specific
      paravirt_ops.  In many cases we can avoid having to do any hypercalls
      for these instructions, or the Xen implementation is quite different
      from the normal native version.
      The privileged instructions fall into the broad classes of:
        Segmentation: setting up the GDT and the GDT entries, LDT,
           TLS and so on.  Xen doesn't allow the GDT to be directly
           modified; all GDT updates are done via hypercalls where the new
           entries can be validated.  This is important because Xen uses
           segment limits to prevent the guest kernel from damaging the
           hypervisor itself.
        Traps and exceptions: Xen uses a special format for trap entrypoints,
           so when the kernel wants to set an IDT entry, it needs to be
           converted to the form Xen expects.  Xen sets int 0x80 up specially
           so that the trap goes straight from userspace into the guest kernel
           without going via the hypervisor.  sysenter isn't supported.
        Kernel stack: The esp0 entry is extracted from the tss and provided to
        TLB operations: the various TLB calls are mapped into corresponding
           Xen hypercalls.
        Control registers: all the control registers are privileged.  The most
           important is cr3, which points to the base of the current pagetable,
           and we handle it specially.
      Another instruction we treat specially is CPUID, even though its not
      privileged.  We want to control what CPU features are visible to the
      rest of the kernel, and so CPUID ends up going into a paravirt_op.
      Xen implements this mainly to disable the ACPI and APIC subsystems.
      Xen maintains its own separate flag for masking events, which is
      contained within the per-cpu vcpu_info structure.  Because the guest
      kernel runs in ring 1 and not 0, the IF flag in EFLAGS is completely
      ignored (and must be, because even if a guest domain disables
      interrupts for itself, it can't disable them overall).
      (A note on terminology: "events" and interrupts are effectively
      synonymous.  However, rather than using an "enable flag", Xen uses a
      "mask flag", which blocks event delivery when it is non-zero.)
      There are paravirt_ops for each of cli/sti/save_fl/restore_fl, which
      are implemented to manage the Xen event mask state.  The only thing
      worth noting is that when events are unmasked, we need to explicitly
      see if there's a pending event and call into the hypervisor to make
      sure it gets delivered.
      Xen needs a couple of upcall (or callback) functions to be implemented
      by each guest.  One is the event upcalls, which is how events
      (interrupts, effectively) are delivered to the guests.  The other is
      the failsafe callback, which is used to report errors in either
      reloading a segment register, or caused by iret.  These are
      implemented in i386/kernel/entry.S so they can jump into the normal
      iret_exc path when necessary.
      Xen provides a multicall mechanism, which allows multiple hypercalls
      to be issued at once in order to mitigate the cost of trapping into
      the hypervisor.  This is particularly useful for context switches,
      since the 4-5 hypercalls they would normally need (reload cr3, update
      TLS, maybe update LDT) can be reduced to one.  This patch implements a
      generic batching mechanism for hypercalls, which gets used in many
      places in the Xen code.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarJeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarChris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
      Cc: Ian Pratt <ian.pratt@xensource.com>
      Cc: Christian Limpach <Christian.Limpach@cl.cam.ac.uk>
      Cc: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
    • Jeremy Fitzhardinge's avatar
      xen: Add Xen interface header files · a42089dd
      Jeremy Fitzhardinge authored
      Add Xen interface header files. These are taken fairly directly from
      the Xen tree, but somewhat rearranged to suit the kernel's conventions.
      Define macros and inline functions for doing hypercalls into the
      Signed-off-by: default avatarJeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarIan Pratt <ian.pratt@xensource.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarChristian Limpach <Christian.Limpach@cl.cam.ac.uk>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarChris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>