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Commits (1749)

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......@@ -142,3 +142,6 @@ x509.genkey
# Kdevelop4
*.kdev4
# Clang's compilation database file
/compile_commands.json
......@@ -98,6 +98,7 @@ Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca> <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
Javi Merino <javi.merino@kernel.org> <javi.merino@arm.com>
<javier@osg.samsung.com> <javier.martinez@collabora.co.uk>
Jean Tourrilhes <jt@hpl.hp.com>
<jean-philippe@linaro.org> <jean-philippe.brucker@arm.com>
Jeff Garzik <jgarzik@pretzel.yyz.us>
Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> <jlayton@redhat.com>
Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> <jlayton@poochiereds.net>
......@@ -116,6 +117,7 @@ John Stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com>
Juha Yrjola <at solidboot.com>
Juha Yrjola <juha.yrjola@nokia.com>
Juha Yrjola <juha.yrjola@solidboot.com>
Julien Thierry <julien.thierry.kdev@gmail.com> <julien.thierry@arm.com>
Kay Sievers <kay.sievers@vrfy.org>
Kenneth W Chen <kenneth.w.chen@intel.com>
Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com> <k.khlebnikov@samsung.com>
......@@ -132,6 +134,7 @@ Linus Lüssing <linus.luessing@c0d3.blue> <linus.luessing@ascom.ch>
Li Yang <leoyang.li@nxp.com> <leo@zh-kernel.org>
Li Yang <leoyang.li@nxp.com> <leoli@freescale.com>
Maciej W. Rozycki <macro@mips.com> <macro@imgtec.com>
Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org> <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Marcin Nowakowski <marcin.nowakowski@mips.com> <marcin.nowakowski@imgtec.com>
Mark Brown <broonie@sirena.org.uk>
Mark Yao <markyao0591@gmail.com> <mark.yao@rock-chips.com>
......
......@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Linux PCI Bus Subsystem
:numbered:
pci
picebus-howto
pciebus-howto
pci-iov-howto
msi-howto
acpi-info
......
......@@ -403,7 +403,7 @@ That is, the recovery API only requires that:
.. note::
Implementation details for the powerpc platform are discussed in
the file Documentation/powerpc/eeh-pci-error-recovery.txt
the file Documentation/powerpc/eeh-pci-error-recovery.rst
As of this writing, there is a growing list of device drivers with
patches implementing error recovery. Not all of these patches are in
......@@ -422,3 +422,6 @@ That is, the recovery API only requires that:
- drivers/net/cxgb3
- drivers/net/s2io.c
- drivers/net/qlge
The End
-------
Using hlist_nulls to protect read-mostly linked lists and
objects using SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU allocations.
Please read the basics in Documentation/RCU/listRCU.txt
Please read the basics in Documentation/RCU/listRCU.rst
Using special makers (called 'nulls') is a convenient way
to solve following problem :
......
# -*- coding: utf-8; mode: python -*-
project = 'Linux Kernel User Documentation'
tags.add("subproject")
latex_documents = [
('index', 'linux-user.tex', 'Linux Kernel User Documentation',
'The kernel development community', 'manual'),
]
......@@ -41,10 +41,11 @@ Related CVEs
The following CVE entries describe Spectre variants:
============= ======================= =================
============= ======================= ==========================
CVE-2017-5753 Bounds check bypass Spectre variant 1
CVE-2017-5715 Branch target injection Spectre variant 2
============= ======================= =================
CVE-2019-1125 Spectre v1 swapgs Spectre variant 1 (swapgs)
============= ======================= ==========================
Problem
-------
......@@ -78,6 +79,13 @@ There are some extensions of Spectre variant 1 attacks for reading data
over the network, see :ref:`[12] <spec_ref12>`. However such attacks
are difficult, low bandwidth, fragile, and are considered low risk.
Note that, despite "Bounds Check Bypass" name, Spectre variant 1 is not
only about user-controlled array bounds checks. It can affect any
conditional checks. The kernel entry code interrupt, exception, and NMI
handlers all have conditional swapgs checks. Those may be problematic
in the context of Spectre v1, as kernel code can speculatively run with
a user GS.
Spectre variant 2 (Branch Target Injection)
-------------------------------------------
......@@ -132,6 +140,9 @@ not cover all possible attack vectors.
1. A user process attacking the kernel
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Spectre variant 1
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The attacker passes a parameter to the kernel via a register or
via a known address in memory during a syscall. Such parameter may
be used later by the kernel as an index to an array or to derive
......@@ -144,7 +155,40 @@ not cover all possible attack vectors.
potentially be influenced for Spectre attacks, new "nospec" accessor
macros are used to prevent speculative loading of data.
Spectre variant 2 attacker can :ref:`poison <poison_btb>` the branch
Spectre variant 1 (swapgs)
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
An attacker can train the branch predictor to speculatively skip the
swapgs path for an interrupt or exception. If they initialize
the GS register to a user-space value, if the swapgs is speculatively
skipped, subsequent GS-related percpu accesses in the speculation
window will be done with the attacker-controlled GS value. This
could cause privileged memory to be accessed and leaked.
For example:
::
if (coming from user space)
swapgs
mov %gs:<percpu_offset>, %reg
mov (%reg), %reg1
When coming from user space, the CPU can speculatively skip the
swapgs, and then do a speculative percpu load using the user GS
value. So the user can speculatively force a read of any kernel
value. If a gadget exists which uses the percpu value as an address
in another load/store, then the contents of the kernel value may
become visible via an L1 side channel attack.
A similar attack exists when coming from kernel space. The CPU can
speculatively do the swapgs, causing the user GS to get used for the
rest of the speculative window.
Spectre variant 2
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
A spectre variant 2 attacker can :ref:`poison <poison_btb>` the branch
target buffer (BTB) before issuing syscall to launch an attack.
After entering the kernel, the kernel could use the poisoned branch
target buffer on indirect jump and jump to gadget code in speculative
......@@ -280,11 +324,18 @@ The sysfs file showing Spectre variant 1 mitigation status is:
The possible values in this file are:
======================================= =================================
'Mitigation: __user pointer sanitation' Protection in kernel on a case by
case base with explicit pointer
sanitation.
======================================= =================================
.. list-table::
* - 'Not affected'
- The processor is not vulnerable.
* - 'Vulnerable: __user pointer sanitization and usercopy barriers only; no swapgs barriers'
- The swapgs protections are disabled; otherwise it has
protection in the kernel on a case by case base with explicit
pointer sanitation and usercopy LFENCE barriers.
* - 'Mitigation: usercopy/swapgs barriers and __user pointer sanitization'
- Protection in the kernel on a case by case base with explicit
pointer sanitation, usercopy LFENCE barriers, and swapgs LFENCE
barriers.
However, the protections are put in place on a case by case basis,
and there is no guarantee that all possible attack vectors for Spectre
......@@ -366,12 +417,27 @@ Turning on mitigation for Spectre variant 1 and Spectre variant 2
1. Kernel mitigation
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Spectre variant 1
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
For the Spectre variant 1, vulnerable kernel code (as determined
by code audit or scanning tools) is annotated on a case by case
basis to use nospec accessor macros for bounds clipping :ref:`[2]
<spec_ref2>` to avoid any usable disclosure gadgets. However, it may
not cover all attack vectors for Spectre variant 1.
Copy-from-user code has an LFENCE barrier to prevent the access_ok()
check from being mis-speculated. The barrier is done by the
barrier_nospec() macro.
For the swapgs variant of Spectre variant 1, LFENCE barriers are
added to interrupt, exception and NMI entry where needed. These
barriers are done by the FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY and
FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY macros.
Spectre variant 2
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
For Spectre variant 2 mitigation, the compiler turns indirect calls or
jumps in the kernel into equivalent return trampolines (retpolines)
:ref:`[3] <spec_ref3>` :ref:`[9] <spec_ref9>` to go to the target
......@@ -473,6 +539,12 @@ Mitigation control on the kernel command line
Spectre variant 2 mitigation can be disabled or force enabled at the
kernel command line.
nospectre_v1
[X86,PPC] Disable mitigations for Spectre Variant 1
(bounds check bypass). With this option data leaks are
possible in the system.
nospectre_v2
[X86] Disable all mitigations for the Spectre variant 2
......
......@@ -2545,7 +2545,7 @@
mem_encrypt=on: Activate SME
mem_encrypt=off: Do not activate SME
Refer to Documentation/virtual/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst
Refer to Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst
for details on when memory encryption can be activated.
mem_sleep_default= [SUSPEND] Default system suspend mode:
......@@ -2604,7 +2604,7 @@
expose users to several CPU vulnerabilities.
Equivalent to: nopti [X86,PPC]
kpti=0 [ARM64]
nospectre_v1 [PPC]
nospectre_v1 [X86,PPC]
nobp=0 [S390]
nospectre_v2 [X86,PPC,S390,ARM64]
spectre_v2_user=off [X86]
......@@ -2965,9 +2965,9 @@
nosmt=force: Force disable SMT, cannot be undone
via the sysfs control file.
nospectre_v1 [PPC] Disable mitigations for Spectre Variant 1 (bounds
check bypass). With this option data leaks are possible
in the system.
nospectre_v1 [X86,PPC] Disable mitigations for Spectre Variant 1
(bounds check bypass). With this option data leaks are
possible in the system.
nospectre_v2 [X86,PPC_FSL_BOOK3E,ARM64] Disable all mitigations for
the Spectre variant 2 (indirect branch prediction)
......@@ -4090,6 +4090,13 @@
Run specified binary instead of /init from the ramdisk,
used for early userspace startup. See initrd.
rdrand= [X86]
force - Override the decision by the kernel to hide the
advertisement of RDRAND support (this affects
certain AMD processors because of buggy BIOS
support, specifically around the suspend/resume
path).
rdt= [HW,X86,RDT]
Turn on/off individual RDT features. List is:
cmt, mbmtotal, mbmlocal, l3cat, l3cdp, l2cat, l2cdp,
......
......@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ disabled, there is ``khugepaged`` daemon that scans memory and
collapses sequences of basic pages into huge pages.
The THP behaviour is controlled via :ref:`sysfs <thp_sysfs>`
interface and using madivse(2) and prctl(2) system calls.
interface and using madvise(2) and prctl(2) system calls.
Transparent Hugepage Support maximizes the usefulness of free memory
if compared to the reservation approach of hugetlbfs by allowing all
......
......@@ -39,7 +39,6 @@ Table : Subdirectories in /proc/sys/net
802 E802 protocol ax25 AX25
ethernet Ethernet protocol rose X.25 PLP layer
ipv4 IP version 4 x25 X.25 protocol
ipx IPX token-ring IBM token ring
bridge Bridging decnet DEC net
ipv6 IP version 6 tipc TIPC
========= =================== = ========== ==================
......@@ -401,33 +400,7 @@ interface.
(network) that the route leads to, the router (may be directly connected), the
route flags, and the device the route is using.
5. IPX
------
The IPX protocol has no tunable values in proc/sys/net.
The IPX protocol does, however, provide proc/net/ipx. This lists each IPX
socket giving the local and remote addresses in Novell format (that is
network:node:port). In accordance with the strange Novell tradition,
everything but the port is in hex. Not_Connected is displayed for sockets that
are not tied to a specific remote address. The Tx and Rx queue sizes indicate
the number of bytes pending for transmission and reception. The state
indicates the state the socket is in and the uid is the owning uid of the
socket.
The /proc/net/ipx_interface file lists all IPX interfaces. For each interface
it gives the network number, the node number, and indicates if the network is
the primary network. It also indicates which device it is bound to (or
Internal for internal networks) and the Frame Type if appropriate. Linux
supports 802.3, 802.2, 802.2 SNAP and DIX (Blue Book) ethernet framing for
IPX.
The /proc/net/ipx_route table holds a list of IPX routes. For each route it
gives the destination network, the router node (or Directly) and the network
address of the router (or Connected) for internal networks.
6. TIPC
5. TIPC
-------
tipc_rmem
......
......@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ import sys
import os
import sphinx
from subprocess import check_output
# Get Sphinx version
major, minor, patch = sphinx.version_info[:3]
......@@ -276,10 +278,21 @@ latex_elements = {
\\setsansfont{DejaVu Sans}
\\setromanfont{DejaVu Serif}
\\setmonofont{DejaVu Sans Mono}
'''
}
# At least one book (translations) may have Asian characters
# with are only displayed if xeCJK is used
cjk_cmd = check_output(['fc-list', '--format="%{family[0]}\n"']).decode('utf-8', 'ignore')
if cjk_cmd.find("Noto Sans CJK SC") >= 0:
print ("enabling CJK for LaTeX builder")
latex_elements['preamble'] += '''
% This is needed for translations
\\usepackage{xeCJK}
\\setCJKmainfont{Noto Sans CJK SC}
'''
# Fix reference escape troubles with Sphinx 1.4.x
if major == 1 and minor > 3:
latex_elements['preamble'] += '\\renewcommand*{\\DUrole}[2]{ #2 }\n'
......@@ -410,6 +423,21 @@ latex_documents = [
'The kernel development community', 'manual'),
]
# Add all other index files from Documentation/ subdirectories
for fn in os.listdir('.'):
doc = os.path.join(fn, "index")
if os.path.exists(doc + ".rst"):
has = False
for l in latex_documents:
if l[0] == doc:
has = True
break
if not has:
latex_documents.append((doc, fn + '.tex',
'Linux %s Documentation' % fn.capitalize(),
'The kernel development community',
'manual'))
# The name of an image file (relative to this directory) to place at the top of
# the title page.
#latex_logo = None
......
# -*- coding: utf-8; mode: python -*-
project = "Core-API Documentation"
tags.add("subproject")
latex_documents = [
('index', 'core-api.tex', project,
'The kernel development community', 'manual'),
]
# -*- coding: utf-8; mode: python -*-
project = 'Linux Kernel Crypto API'
tags.add("subproject")
latex_documents = [
('index', 'crypto-api.tex', 'Linux Kernel Crypto API manual',
'The kernel development community', 'manual'),
]
# -*- coding: utf-8; mode: python -*-
project = "Development tools for the kernel"
tags.add("subproject")
latex_documents = [
('index', 'dev-tools.tex', project,
'The kernel development community', 'manual'),
]
......@@ -19,7 +19,9 @@ quiet_cmd_mk_schema = SCHEMA $@
DT_DOCS = $(shell \
cd $(srctree)/$(src) && \
find * \( -name '*.yaml' ! -name $(DT_TMP_SCHEMA) \) \
find * \( -name '*.yaml' ! \
-name $(DT_TMP_SCHEMA) ! \
-name '*.example.dt.yaml' \) \
)
DT_SCHEMA_FILES ?= $(addprefix $(src)/,$(DT_DOCS))
......
......@@ -703,4 +703,4 @@ cpus {
https://www.devicetree.org/specifications/
[6] ARM Linux Kernel documentation - Booting AArch64 Linux
Documentation/arm64/booting.txt
Documentation/arm64/booting.rst
# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
%YAML 1.2
---
$id: http://devicetree.org/schemas/arm/shmobile.yaml#
$id: http://devicetree.org/schemas/arm/renesas.yaml#
$schema: http://devicetree.org/meta-schemas/core.yaml#
title: Renesas SH-Mobile, R-Mobile, and R-Car Platform Device Tree Bindings
......
# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
%YAML 1.2
---
$id: http://devicetree.org/schemas/arm/milbeaut.yaml#
$id: http://devicetree.org/schemas/arm/socionext/milbeaut.yaml#
$schema: http://devicetree.org/meta-schemas/core.y