* common/compliance.c (gnupg_pk_is_allowed): Handle EdDSA.
* g10/gpg.c (oOverrideComplianceCheck): Remove.
(opts): Turn --override-compliance-check into a dummy option.
* g10/options.h (opt): Remove override_compliance_check.
* g10/sig-check.c (check_key_verify_compliance): Remove use of that
option.
--

The introduction of --override-compliance-check actually hid the real
cause for the signature verification problem in de-vs mode for the
Ed25519 key.  The real fix is to handle the EdDSA algorithm in
gnupg_pk_is_allowed.

Fixes-commit: fb26e144
GnuPG-bug-id: 5655

* g10/mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Do not check whether status is
enabled when checking compliance.

--

Note that we now print Copyright g10 Code instead of FSF.

* tools/wks-util.c (write_to_file): Rename to ...
(wks_write_to_file): this, make global, and support NULL for fname.
* tools/gpg-wks-client.c (command_check): Write to key.

--

Note that --unwrap is an option and not a command.  Thus it modifies
the behaviour of the default operation or of -d.

* common/miscellaneous.c (is_file_compressed): Add detect code.
--

GnuPG-bug-id: 6332

* tools/call-dirmngr.c (wkd_get_status_cb): Deetect and output warning
and note stati from dirmngr.
--

This is in particular helpful to check for non-proper TLS
certificates.

* common/iobuf.c (file_filter_ctx_t): Add fields for the peek feature.
(file_filter): Implement peeking.
(iobuf_ioctl): Add new IOBUF_IOCTL_PEEK.
* common/iobuf.h (IOBUF_IOCTL_PEEK, IOBUFCTRL_PEEK): New.
* common/miscellaneous.c (is_file_compressed): Rewrite.  Detect PDF.
* g10/encrypt.c (encrypt_simple): Peek before detecting compression.
(encrypt_crypt): Ditto.
* g10/sign.c (sign_file): Also detect already compressed data.

* g10/options.h (opt): Add explicit_compress_option.
* g10/gpg.c (main): Set opt.explicit_compress_option for -z.

--

Note that this patch also introduces a compression check for signing
which was never done in the past.

GnuPG-bug-id: 6332

--

* tools/gpgtar-create.c (gpgtar_create): Do not close the status_fd in
spawn.
* tools/gpgtar-extract.c (gpgtar_extract): Ditto.
* tools/gpgtar-list.c (gpgtar_list): Ditto.
--

Note that this fix does not handle file descripotors passed via the
--gpg-args options.

GnuPG-bug-id: 6348

* common/compliance.c (gnupg_pk_is_compliant): Also consider the
gcrypt vids for ECDSA et al.
(gnupg_pk_is_allowed): Ditto.
* sm/verify.c (gpgsm_verify): Consider the curve.  Print a compliance
notice for a non-compliant key.

* sm/certchain.c (gpgsm_validate_chain): Silence the "switching to
chain model".

* dirmngr/dirmngr.c (post_option_parsing): Add arg CMD.
(main): Pass the current command.
--

Updates-commit: 9f37e93d

* common/init.c (_init_common_subsystems): Test and set the DEP
Policy.
--

Note that this change will now definitely require Windows XP SP3.

--

Unfortunately the a reflow took place.

* tests/gpgme/Makefile.am: Don't use setup.scm/ dir.
* tests/gpgme/all-tests.scm: Fix the name of the environment.

--

GnuPG-bug-id: 6313
Fixes-commit: c19ea75f


Signed-off-by: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>

--

--

--

They were obvious.

--

* common/mapstrings.c (map_static_macro_string): Add hack.
--

--

--

* g10/export.c (do_export_one_keyblock): Handle a cancel for the
primary key special.
--

GnuPG-bug-id: 6093

* g10/cipher-aead.c (do_flush): Use %llu and a cast.
* g10/decrypt-data.c (aead_underflow): Ditto.
--

Fixes-commit: b2cedc10

We don't use the system's printf but the one implemented by
us (gpgrt's estream-printf) thus the PRIu64 may or may not be correct.
We can't do much about the -Wformat errors due to our different
implementation.

--

--

--

Reported-by: Andreas Metzler
GnuPG-bug-id: 6309

* tests/gpgme/Makefile.am: Create directories for logs.

--

Signed-off-by: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>

* agent/command.c (cmd_scd): Allow it.
--

This is important because Scute uses "SCD SERIALNO --all".

* scd/app-p15.c (select_and_read_record): Special case deleted
records.  Support 3 byte TLVs.
(read_ef_prkdf): Skip deleted records.
(read_ef_pukdf): Ditto.
(read_ef_cdf): Ditto.
(read_ef_aodf): Ditto.
--

This fixes a problem with some CardOS 5 applications.

* agent/Makefile.am [HAVE_W32CE_SYSTEM]: Remove.
* am/cmacros.am [HAVE_W32CE_SYSTEM]: Remove.
* autogen.sh: Remove W32ce_ variables.
* configure.ac: Likewise.
* dirmngr/Makefile.am (extra_bin_ldflags): Remove.
* g10/Makefile.am [HAVE_W32CE_SYSTEM]: Remove.
* kbx/Makefile.am: Likewise.
* sm/Makefile.am (extra_bin_ldflags): Remove.
* tools/Makefile.am (extra_bin_ldflags): Remove.

--

Signed-off-by: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>

* tools/gpg-wks.h (struct uidinfo_list_s): Add fields expired and
revoked.
* tools/wks-util.c (append_to_uidinfo_list): Add args expired and
revoked.
(set_expired_revoked): New.
(wks_list_key): Set expired and revoked.
(wks_cmd_install_key): Skip expired uids.
* tools/gpg-wks-client.c (command_check): Print flags.
(command_send): Ignore expired keys.
(mirror_one_key): Ditto.

* g10/export.c (do_export_stream): Silence warning.
--

GnuPG-bug-id: 6292

* sm/certchain.c (is_cert_still_valid): Print revocation reason.

* sm/keydb.c (keydb_set_cert_flags): Fix error test.

* dirmngr/ocsp.c (ocsp_isvalid): Add args r_revoked_at and
r_revocation_reason.
* dirmngr/server.c (cmd_isvalid): Emit a new REVOCATIONINFO status.
(cmd_checkocsp): Ditto.

* sm/call-dirmngr.c (struct isvalid_status_parm_s): Add new fields.
(isvalid_status_cb): Parse REVOCATIONINFO.
(gpgsm_dirmngr_isvalid): Add args r_revoked_at and
r_revocation_reason.

* sm/gpgsm.h (struct server_control_s): Add fields revoked_art and
revocation_reason.
* sm/keylist.c (list_cert_raw): Print revocation date.
(list_cert_std): Ditto.
--

Note that for now we do this only for OCSP because it is an important
piece of information when using the chain model.  For a sample key see
commit 7fa1d3cc.

* sm/certchain.c (check_cert_policy): Print non-critical policy
warning only in verbose mode.

* sm/call-dirmngr.c (gpgsm_dirmngr_isvalid): Do not use
option --force-default-responder.
* sm/certchain.c (is_cert_still_valid): Rename arg for clarity.
(gpgsm_validate_chain): Always switch to chain model.
--

The trustlist.txt may indicate that a root CA issues certificates
which shall be validated using the chain model.  This is for example
the case for qualified signatures.  Before this change we did this
only if the default shell model indicated that a certificate has
expired.  This optimization is technically okay but has one problem:
The chain model requires the use of OCSP but we switch to this only
when running the chain model validation.  To catch revoked
certificates using OCSP we need to always switch to the chain model
unless OCSP has been enabled anyway.

Note that the old --force-default-responder option is not anymore
used.

Test cases are certificates issued by

  # CN=TeleSec qualified Root CA 1
  # O=Deutsche Telekom AG
  # C=DE
  # 2.5.4.97=USt-IdNr. DE 123475223
  90:C6:13:6C:7D:EF:EF:E9:7C:C7:64:F9:D2:67:8E:AD:03:E5:52:96 \
    S cm qual relax

A sample revoked certificate is

-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----

* agent/command.c (cmd_export_key): Add option --mode1003.
(command_has_option): Ditto.
* g10/build-packet.c (do_key): Implement mode 1003.
* g10/parse-packet.c (parse_key): Ditto.
* g10/options.h (EXPORT_MODE1003): New.o
* g10/call-agent.c (agent_export_key): Add arg mode1003.
* g10/export.c (parse_export_options): Add "mode1003"
(secret_key_to_mode1003): New.
(receive_seckey_from_agent): Add arg mode1003.
(do_export_one_keyblock): Pass option down.
--

This option allows to export a secret key in GnuPG's native format.
Thus no re-encryption is required and further the public key parameters
are also authenticated if a protection passphrase has been used.

Note that --import is not yet able to handle this new mode.  Although
old version of GnuPG will bail out with "invalid packet" if a mode1003
exported secret key is seen.