Commit ed205a6b authored by Lennart Poettering's avatar Lennart Poettering

bus: when parsing enforce maximum container depth

parent 2bf938c1
......@@ -118,6 +118,8 @@ static inline void bus_unrefp(sd_bus **b) {
#define BUS_MESSAGE_SIZE_MAX (64*1024*1024)
#define BUS_AUTH_SIZE_MAX (64*1024)
#define BUS_CONTAINER_DEPTH 128
/* Defined by the specification as maximum size of an array in
* bytes */
#define BUS_ARRAY_MAX_SIZE 67108864
......
......@@ -1741,6 +1741,25 @@ int sd_bus_message_enter_container(sd_bus_message *m, char type, const char *con
if (!contents)
return -EINVAL;
/*
* We enforce a global limit on container depth, that is much
* higher than the 32 structs and 32 arrays the specification
* mandates. This is simpler to implement for us, and we need
* this only to ensure our container array doesn't grow
* without bounds. We are happy to return any data from a
* message as long as the data itself is valid, even if the
* overall message might be not.
*
* Note that the message signature is validated when
* parsing the headers, and that validation does check the
* 32/32 limit.
*
* Note that the specification defines no limits on the depth
* of stacked variants, but we do.
*/
if (m->n_containers >= BUS_CONTAINER_DEPTH)
return -EBADMSG;
w = realloc(m->containers, sizeof(struct bus_container) * (m->n_containers + 1));
if (!w)
return -ENOMEM;
......
......@@ -32,7 +32,6 @@
* - make unix fd passing work
* - add page donation logic
* - api for appending/reading fixed arrays
* - always verify container depth
* - merge busctl into systemctl or so?
* - add object handlers
* - implicitly add stub introspection calls
......
Markdown is supported
0% or
You are about to add 0 people to the discussion. Proceed with caution.
Finish editing this message first!
Please register or to comment