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    7c0ea593
    openvswitch: fix stack OOB read while fragmenting IPv4 packets · 7c0ea593
    Davide Caratti authored
    
    running openvswitch on kernels built with KASAN, it's possible to see the
    following splat while testing fragmentation of IPv4 packets:
    
     BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
     Read of size 1 at addr ffff888112fc713c by task handler2/1367
    
     CPU: 0 PID: 1367 Comm: handler2 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc6+ #418
     Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.11.1-4.module+el8.1.0+4066+0f1aadab 04/01/2014
     Call Trace:
      dump_stack+0x92/0xc1
      print_address_description.constprop.7+0x1a/0x150
      kasan_report.cold.13+0x7f/0x111
      ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
      ovs_fragment+0x5bf/0x840 [openvswitch]
      do_execute_actions+0x1bd5/0x2400 [openvswitch]
      ovs_execute_actions+0xc8/0x3d0 [openvswitch]
      ovs_packet_cmd_execute+0xa39/0x1150 [openvswitch]
      genl_family_rcv_msg_doit.isra.15+0x227/0x2d0
      genl_rcv_msg+0x287/0x490
      netlink_rcv_skb+0x120/0x380
      genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
      netlink_unicast+0x439/0x630
      netlink_sendmsg+0x719/0xbf0
      sock_sendmsg+0xe2/0x110
      ____sys_sendmsg+0x5ba/0x890
      ___sys_sendmsg+0xe9/0x160
      __sys_sendmsg+0xd3/0x170
      do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
      entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
     RIP: 0033:0x7f957079db07
     Code: c3 66 90 41 54 41 89 d4 55 48 89 f5 53 89 fb 48 83 ec 10 e8 eb ec ff ff 44 89 e2 48 89 ee 89 df 41 89 c0 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 35 44 89 c7 48 89 44 24 08 e8 24 ed ff ff 48
     RSP: 002b:00007f956ce35a50 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
     RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000019 RCX: 00007f957079db07
     RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007f956ce35ae0 RDI: 0000000000000019
     RBP: 00007f956ce35ae0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f9558006730
     R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000000000000000
     R13: 00007f956ce37308 R14: 00007f956ce35f80 R15: 00007f956ce35ae0
    
     The buggy address belongs to the page:
     page:00000000af2a1d93 refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x112fc7
     flags: 0x17ffffc0000000()
     raw: 0017ffffc0000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
     raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
     page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
    
     addr ffff888112fc713c is located in stack of task handler2/1367 at offset 180 in frame:
      ovs_fragment+0x0/0x840 [openvswitch]
    
     this frame has 2 objects:
      [32, 144) 'ovs_dst'
      [192, 424) 'ovs_rt'
    
     Memory state around the buggy address:
      ffff888112fc7000: f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
      ffff888112fc7080: 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
     >ffff888112fc7100: 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                                             ^
      ffff888112fc7180: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
      ffff888112fc7200: 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    
    for IPv4 packets, ovs_fragment() uses a temporary struct dst_entry. Then,
    in the following call graph:
    
      ip_do_fragment()
        ip_skb_dst_mtu()
          ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward()
            ip_mtu_locked()
    
    the pointer to struct dst_entry is used as pointer to struct rtable: this
    turns the access to struct members like rt_mtu_locked into an OOB read in
    the stack. Fix this changing the temporary variable used for IPv4 packets
    in ovs_fragment(), similarly to what is done for IPv6 few lines below.
    
    Fixes: d52e5a7e ("ipv4: lock mtu in fnhe when received PMTU < net.ipv4.route.min_pmt")
    Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
    Acked-by: default avatarEelco Chaudron <echaudro@redhat.com>
    Signed-off-by: default avatarDavide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com>
    Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
    7c0ea593
    History
    openvswitch: fix stack OOB read while fragmenting IPv4 packets
    Davide Caratti authored
    
    running openvswitch on kernels built with KASAN, it's possible to see the
    following splat while testing fragmentation of IPv4 packets:
    
     BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
     Read of size 1 at addr ffff888112fc713c by task handler2/1367
    
     CPU: 0 PID: 1367 Comm: handler2 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc6+ #418
     Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.11.1-4.module+el8.1.0+4066+0f1aadab 04/01/2014
     Call Trace:
      dump_stack+0x92/0xc1
      print_address_description.constprop.7+0x1a/0x150
      kasan_report.cold.13+0x7f/0x111
      ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
      ovs_fragment+0x5bf/0x840 [openvswitch]
      do_execute_actions+0x1bd5/0x2400 [openvswitch]
      ovs_execute_actions+0xc8/0x3d0 [openvswitch]
      ovs_packet_cmd_execute+0xa39/0x1150 [openvswitch]
      genl_family_rcv_msg_doit.isra.15+0x227/0x2d0
      genl_rcv_msg+0x287/0x490
      netlink_rcv_skb+0x120/0x380
      genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
      netlink_unicast+0x439/0x630
      netlink_sendmsg+0x719/0xbf0
      sock_sendmsg+0xe2/0x110
      ____sys_sendmsg+0x5ba/0x890
      ___sys_sendmsg+0xe9/0x160
      __sys_sendmsg+0xd3/0x170
      do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
      entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
     RIP: 0033:0x7f957079db07
     Code: c3 66 90 41 54 41 89 d4 55 48 89 f5 53 89 fb 48 83 ec 10 e8 eb ec ff ff 44 89 e2 48 89 ee 89 df 41 89 c0 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 35 44 89 c7 48 89 44 24 08 e8 24 ed ff ff 48
     RSP: 002b:00007f956ce35a50 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
     RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000019 RCX: 00007f957079db07
     RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007f956ce35ae0 RDI: 0000000000000019
     RBP: 00007f956ce35ae0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f9558006730
     R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000000000000000
     R13: 00007f956ce37308 R14: 00007f956ce35f80 R15: 00007f956ce35ae0
    
     The buggy address belongs to the page:
     page:00000000af2a1d93 refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x112fc7
     flags: 0x17ffffc0000000()
     raw: 0017ffffc0000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
     raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
     page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
    
     addr ffff888112fc713c is located in stack of task handler2/1367 at offset 180 in frame:
      ovs_fragment+0x0/0x840 [openvswitch]
    
     this frame has 2 objects:
      [32, 144) 'ovs_dst'
      [192, 424) 'ovs_rt'
    
     Memory state around the buggy address:
      ffff888112fc7000: f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
      ffff888112fc7080: 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
     >ffff888112fc7100: 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                                             ^
      ffff888112fc7180: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
      ffff888112fc7200: 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    
    for IPv4 packets, ovs_fragment() uses a temporary struct dst_entry. Then,
    in the following call graph:
    
      ip_do_fragment()
        ip_skb_dst_mtu()
          ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward()
            ip_mtu_locked()
    
    the pointer to struct dst_entry is used as pointer to struct rtable: this
    turns the access to struct members like rt_mtu_locked into an OOB read in
    the stack. Fix this changing the temporary variable used for IPv4 packets
    in ovs_fragment(), similarly to what is done for IPv6 few lines below.
    
    Fixes: d52e5a7e ("ipv4: lock mtu in fnhe when received PMTU < net.ipv4.route.min_pmt")
    Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
    Acked-by: default avatarEelco Chaudron <echaudro@redhat.com>
    Signed-off-by: default avatarDavide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com>
    Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>